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Abstract
We introduce a computational problem of distinguishing between two specific quantum states as a new
cryptographic problem to design a quantum cryptographic scheme that is “secure” against any polynomial-
time quantum adversary. Our problem, QSCDff , is to distinguish between two types of random coset
states with a hidden permutation over the symmetric group of finite degree. This naturally generalizes
the commonly-used distinction problem between two probability distributions in computational cryptogra-
phy. As our major contribution, we show that QSCDff has three properties of cryptographic interest: (i)
QSCDff has a trapdoor; (ii) the average-case hardness of QSCDff coincides with its worst-case hardness;
and (iii) QSCDff is computationally at least as hard as the graph automorphism problem in the worst case.
These cryptographic properties enable us to construct a quantum public-key cryptosystem, which is likely
to withstand any chosen plaintext attack of a polynomial-time quantum adversary. We further discuss a gen-
eralization of QSCDff , called QSCDcyc , and introduce a multi-bit encryption scheme that relies on similar
cryptographic properties of QSCDcyc .
Keywords: quantum cryptography, computational indistinguishability, trapdoor, worst-case/average-case
equivalence, graph automorphism problem, quantum public-key cryptosystem.
1 Introduction
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [17] first used a computationally intractable problem to design a key exchange
protocol. Computational cryptography has since then become an important field of extensive study. A number
of practical cryptographic systems (e.g., public-key cryptosystems (PKCs), bit commitment schemes (BCSs),
pseudorandom generators, and digital signature schemes) have been proposed under popular intractability as-
sumptions, such as the hardness of the integer factorization problem (IFP) and the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), for which no efficient classical algorithm has been found. Using the power of quantum computation,
however, we can efficiently solve various number-theoretic problems, including IFP (and thus, the quadratic
residuosity problem) [56], DLP (and also the Diffie-Hellman problem) [11, 32, 56], and the principal ideal
problem [24] (see also [15, 55]). This indicates that a quantum adversary (i.e., an adversary who operates
∗The preliminary version [30] appeared in the Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.3494,
pp.268–284, Aahus, Denmark, May 22–26, 2005.
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a quantum computer) can easily break any cryptosystems whose security proofs rely on the computational
hardness of those problems.
In order to deal with such a powerful quantum adversary, a new area of cryptography, so-called quantum
cryptography, has emerged in the past quarter century. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [8] first proposed a
quantum key distribution scheme, in which a party can securely send a secret key to another party through
a quantum communication channel. Its unconditional security was later proven by Mayers [40] (and more
sophisticated proofs were given by, e.g., Shor and Preskill [57] and Renner [51]). Against our early hope, quan-
tum mechanics cannot make all cryptographic schemes information-theoretically secure since, for instance, as
Mayers [39] and Lo and Chau [37] independently demonstrated, no quantum BCS can be both unconditionally
concealing and binding. Therefore, “computational” approaches are still important and also viable in quantum
cryptography. Along this line of study, a number of quantum cryptographic properties have been discussed
from complexity-theoretic viewpoints [1, 13, 14, 16, 18, 48].
In fact, a quantum computer is capable of breaking the RSA cryptosystem and many other well-known
classical cryptosystems. It is therefore imperative to discover computationally-hard problems from which we
can construct a quantum cryptosystem that is secure against any polynomial-time quantum adversary. For in-
stance, the subset sum (knapsack) problem and the shortest vector problem are used as bases of knapsack-based
cryptosystems [29, 48] as well as lattice-based cryptosystems [4, 49, 52]. Since we do not know whether these
problems withstand any attack by quantum adversaries, we need to continue searching for better intractable
problems that can guard their associated quantum cryptosystems against any computationally-bounded quan-
tum adversary.
This paper naturally generalizes a notion of the computational indistinguishability between two probability
distributions [9, 20, 60] to that between two quantum states. In particular, we present a distinction problem,
called QSCDff (quantum state computational distinction with fully flipped permutations), between specific
ensembles of quantum states. It turns out that QSCDff enjoys useful cryptographic properties as a building
block of a secure quantum cryptosystem. Henceforth, N denotes the set of all non-negative integers.
Definition 1.1 The advantage of a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that distinguishes between two
ensembles {ρ0(l)}l∈N and {ρ1(l)}l∈N of quantum states is the function δA(l) defined as:
δA(l) =
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρ0(l)) = 1]− PrA [A(ρ1(l)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣
for two l-qubit quantum states ρ0(l) and ρ1(l), where the subscript A of the probability means that any output
of A is determined by measuring the final state of A in the standard computational basis. We say that two
ensembles {ρ0(l)}l∈N and {ρ1(l)}l∈N are computationally indistinguishable if the advantage δA(l) is negligible
for any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A; namely, for any polynomial p, any polynomial-time quantum
algorithm A, and any sufficiently large number l, it holds that δA(l) < 1/p(l). The distinction problem
between {ρ0(l)}l∈N and {ρ1(l)}l∈N is said to be solvable with non-negligible advantage if these ensembles
are not computationally indistinguishable; that is, there exist a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A and a
polynomial p such that ∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρ0(l)) = 1]− PrA [A(ρ1(l)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > 1p(l)
for infinitely many numbers l.
Let N = {n ∈ N : n is even and n/2 is odd} = {n ∈ N : n ≡ 2 (mod 4)}. The problem QSCDff
asks whether an adversary can distinguish between two sequences of identical copies of ρ+pi (n) and of ρ−pi (n),
where n is a length parameter in N and π is unknown to the adversary. For each n ∈ N , let Sn denote the
symmetric group of degree n and let Kn = {π ∈ Sn : π2 = id and ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}[π(i) 6= i]}, where id
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stands for the identity permutation. We say a permutation is odd if it can be expressed by an odd number of
transpositions, and even otherwise. Denote by sgn the sign function of permutations, defined as sgn(π) = 0
if π is even and sgn(π) = 0 if π is odd. Notice that, for each n ∈ N , sgn(π) = 1 for every π ∈ Kn (i.e.,
π ∈ Kn is an odd permutation) since π consists of n/2 disjoint transpositions; in other words, it holds that
π = (i1 i2)(i3i4) · · · (in−1 in) for n distinct numbers i1, . . . , in in {1, ..., n}. This simple fact will be used for
certain properties of QSCDff .
Definition 1.2 For each π ∈ Kn, let ρ+pi (n) and ρ−pi (n) be two quantum states defined by
ρ+pi (n) =
1
2n!
∑
σ∈Sn
(|σ〉+ |σπ〉)(〈σ| + 〈σπ|) and ρ−pi (n) =
1
2n!
∑
σ∈Sn
(|σ〉 − |σπ〉)(〈σ| − 〈σπ|).
The problem QSCDff is the distinction problem between two quantum states ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n) and ρ−pi (n)⊗k(n) for
each parameter n in N , where k is a polynomial. For each fixed polynomial k, we use the succinct notation
k-QSCDff instead.
To simplify our notation, we often drop the parameter n whenever it is clear from the context. For instance,
we write ρ+⊗kpi instead of ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n). More generally, k-QSCDff can be defined for any integer-valued func-
tion k. Note that Definition 1.2 uses the parameter n to express the “length” of the quantum states instead of the
parameter l of Definition 1.1. Speaking of polynomial-time indistinguishability, however, there is essentially no
difference between n and l because ρ+pi and ρ−pi can be expressed by O(n log n) qubits and k(n) is a polynomial
in n. In this paper, the parameter n serves as a unit of the computational complexity of our target problem and
it is often referred to as the security parameter in a cryptographic context.
1.1 Our Contributions
This paper presents three properties of QSCDff and their direct implications toward building a secure quantum
cryptographic scheme. These properties are summarized as follows. (i) QSCDff has a trapdoor; namely, we can
efficiently distinguish between ρ+pi and ρ−pi if π ∈ Kn is known. (ii) The average-case hardness of QSCDff over a
randomly chosen permutation π ∈ Kn coincides with its worst-case hardness. (iii) QSCDff is computationally
at least as hard in the worst case as the graph automorphism problem (GA), where GA is the graph-theoretical
problem defined as:
GRAPH AUTOMORPHISM PROBLEM (GA):
input: an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges;
output: YES if G has a non-trivial automorphism, and NO otherwise.
Since there is no known efficient algorithmic solution for GA, the third property suggests that QSCDff should be
difficult to solve in polynomial time. We are also able to show, without any assumption, that no time-unbounded
quantum algorithm can solve o(n log n)-QSCDff . Making use of the aforementioned three cryptographic prop-
erties, we can design a computationally-secure quantum PKC whose security relies on the worst-case hardness
of GA. The following subsection will discuss in depth numerous advantages of using QSCDff as a basis of
secure quantum cryptosystems.
As a further generalization of QSCDff , we present another distinction problem QSCDcyc, which satisfies
the following cryptographic properties: (i) it has a trapdoor and (ii) its average-case hardness coincides with the
worst-case hardness. This new problem becomes a basis for another public-key cryptosystem that can encrypt
messages longer than those encrypted by the encryption scheme based on QSCDff .
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1.2 Comparison between Our Work and Previous Work
In a large volume of the past literature, computational-complexity aspects of quantum states have been spot-
lighted in connection to quantum cryptography. In the context of quantum zero-knowledge proofs, for instance,
the notion of statistical distinguishability between two quantum states was investigated by Watrous [59] and also
by Kobayashi [33]. They proved that certain problems of statistical distinction between two quantum states are
promise-complete for quantum zero-knowledge proof systems. Concerning the computational complexity of
quantum-state generation, Aharonov and Ta-Shma [2] studied its direct connection to quantum adiabatic com-
puting as well as statistical zero-knowledge proofs. In a similar vein, our distinction problem QSCDff is also
rooted in computational complexity theory.
In the remaining of this subsection, we briefly discuss various advantages of using QSCDff as a basis of
quantum cryptosystems by comparing it with the underlying problems of existing cryptosystems.
Average-Case Hardness versus Worst-Case Hardness. For any given problem, its efficient solvability on
average does not, in general, guarantee that the problem should be solved efficiently even in the worst case.
Consider the following property of cryptographic problems: the average-case hardness of the problem is “equiv-
alent” to its worst-case hardness under a certain type of polynomial-time reduction. Since the worst-case
hardness of the problem is much more desirable, this average-case/worst-case property certainly increases our
confidence in the security of the cryptographic scheme. Unfortunately, few cryptographic problems are known
to enjoy this property.
In the literature, there are two major categories of worst-case/average-case reductions. The first category
involves a strong reduction, which transforms an arbitrary instance of length n to a random instance of the
same length n or rather length polynomial in n. With this strong reduction, Ajtai [3] found a remarkable
connection between average-case hardness and worst-case hardness of certain variants of the so-called shortest
vector problem (SVP). He gave an efficient reduction from a problem of approximating the shortest vector
of a given n-dimensional lattice in the worst case to another problem of approximating the shortest vector of
a random lattice within a larger approximation factor. Later, Micciancio and Regev [41] established a much
better average-case/worst-case connection with respect to the approximation of SVP.
Unlike the first one, the second category is represented by a weak reduction of Tompa and Woll [58], where
the reduction is randomized only over a certain portion of all the instances. A typical example is DLP, which can
be randomly reduced to itself by a reduction that maps instances not to all instances of the same length but rather
to all instances of the same underlying group. Concerning DLP, it is not known whether an efficient reduction
exists from DLP with the worst-case prime to DLP with a random prime. By Shor’s algorithm [56], we can
efficiently solve DLP as well as the inverting problem of the RSA function, which have worst-case/average-case
reductions of the second category. The graph isomorphism problem (GI) and the aforementioned GA—well-
known graph-theoretical problems—also satisfy weak worst-case/average-case reductions [58] although there
is no known cryptosystem whose security relies on their hardness. See [10] and references therein for more
information on worst-case/average-case reductions.
In this paper, we show that QSCDff has a worst-case/average-case reduction of the first category. Unlike
the reduction of DLP, our reduction depends only on the size of each instance. In fact, our distinction problem
QSCDff is the first cryptographic problem having a worst-case/average-case reduction of the first category;
namely, the worst case of the problem can be reduced to the average case of the same problem. Our reduction is
similar in flavor to the reductions used for the aforementioned lattice problems. In the case of the approximation
of SVP, however, an approximation problem of SVP can be reduced randomly only to another approximation
problem with a worse parameter. Note that, on a quantum computer, no efficient solution is currently known
for QSCDff .
4
Computational Hardness of Underlying Computational Problems. The hidden subgroup problem (HSP)
has played a central role in various discussions on the strengths and limitations of quantum computation. The
aforementioned IFP and DLP can be reduced to special cases of HSP on Abelian groups (AHSP). Kitaev
[32] showed how to solve AHSP efficiently; in particular, he gave a polynomial-time algorithm that performs
the quantum Fourier transformation over Abelian groups, which is a generalization of the quantum Fourier
transformation used in, e.g., Shor’s algorithm [56]. To solve HSP on non-Abelian groups, a simple application
of currently known techniques may not be sufficient despite of the existence of an efficient quantum algorithm
for AHSP. Notice that, over certain specific non-Abelian groups, HSP was already solved in [6, 19, 22, 28, 36,
43, 50]. Another important variant of HSP is HSP on the dihedral groups (DHSP). Regev [50] demonstrated
a quantum reduction from the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP) to a slightly different variant of DHSP,
where uSVP can serve as a basis of lattice-based PKCs defined in [4, 49]. A subexponential-time quantum
algorithm for DHSP was found by Kuperberg [36]. Although these results do not immediately give a desired
subexponential-time quantum algorithm for uSVP, it could eventually lead us to design the desired algorithm.
Our problem QSCDff is closely related to another variant: HSP on the symmetric groups (SHSP), which
appears to be much more difficult to solve than the aforementioned variants of HSP do. Note that no known
subexponential-time quantum algorithm exists for SHSP. Recently, Hallgren, Russell, and Ta-Shma [28] intro-
duced a distinction problem, similar to QSCDff , between certain two quantum states to discuss the computa-
tional intractability of SHSP by a “natural” extension of Shor’s algorithm [56]. In this paper, we refer to their
distinction problem as DIST. An efficient solution to DIST gives rise to an efficient quantum algorithm for a
certain special case of SHSP. To solve DIST, as they showed, we require exponentially many trials of the so-
called weak Fourier sampling that works on a single copy of the quantum states. In other words, exponentially
many copies are needed in total as far as the weak Fourier sampling is used.
This result was improved by Grigni, Schulman, Vazirani, and Vazirani [22], who proved that exponentially
many copies are necessary even if we use a powerful method, known as strong Fourier sampling, along with
a random choice of the bases of the representations of the symmetric group Sn. Concerning the computa-
tional hardness of SHSP, Kempe and Shalev [31] further expanded the results of [22, 28] with quantum Fourier
sampling methods. Moore, Russell, and Schulman [44], on the contrary, demonstrated that, regardless of the
method (such as the above quantum Fourier sampling methods), any time-unbounded quantum algorithm work-
ing on a single copy needs exp(Ω(n)) trials to solve DIST. Even for the case of two copies, Moore and Russell
[42] argued that any time-unbounded quantum algorithm that simultaneously works over two copies requires
exp(Ω(
√
n/ log n)) trials at best. Their results were further improved by Hallgren, Moore, Ro¨tteler, Russell,
and Sen [26], who proved that no time-unbounded quantum algorithm solves DIST even if it simultaneously
works over o(n log n) copies. In this paper, we show that the distinction problem DIST is, in fact, polynomial-
time reducible to QSCDff . This immediately implies, from the above results, that no quantum algorithm solves
QSCDff using o(n log n) copies.
Even by supplying sufficiently many copies to an algorithm, there is no known subexponential-time quan-
tum algorithm that solves QSCDff , and thus finding such an algorithm seems a daunting task. This situation
indicates that our problem, QSCDff , is much more suitable than, for example, uSVP for an underlying in-
tractable problem to build a secure cryptosystem. There is a similarity with the classical case of DLP over
different groups; namely, DLP over Z∗p (where p is a prime) is classically computable in subexponential time
whereas no known classical subexponential-time algorithm exists for DLP over certain groups in elliptic curve
cryptography. From this reason, it is generally believed that DLP over such groups is more reliable than DLP
over Z∗p.
We prove that the computational complexity of QSCDff is lower-bounded by that of GA. Well-known upper
bounds of GA include NP ∩ co-AM [21, 54], SPP [5], and UAP [12]; however, GA is not known to sit in
NP ∩ co-NP. Notice that, since most cryptographic problems fall in NP ∩ co-NP, very few cryptographic
systems are lower-bounded by the worst-case hardness of problems outside of NP ∩ co-NP.
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Quantum Computational Cryptography. Apart from PKCs, quantum key distribution gives a foundation
to symmetric-key cryptology; for instance, the quantum key distribution scheme in [8] achieves uncondition-
ally secure sharing of secret keys in symmetric-key cryptosystems (SKCs) through an authenticated classical
communication channel and an insecure quantum communication channel. Undoubtedly, both SKCs and PKCs
have their own advantages and disadvantages. Compared with SKCs, PKCs require fewer secret keys in a
large-scale network; however, they often need certain intractability assumptions for their security proofs and
are typically vulnerable to, e.g., the man-in-the-middle attack. As an immediate application of QSCDff , we
propose a new computational quantum PKC whose security relies on the computational hardness of QSCDff .
Of many existing PKCs, few make their security proofs solely rely on the worst-case hardness of their
underlying problems, such as lattice-based PKCs (see, e.g., [52]). A quantum adversary is a powerful foe who
can easily break many PKCs whose underlying problems are number-theoretic, because these problems can
be efficiently solved on a quantum computer. Based on a certain subset of the knapsack problem, Okamoto,
Tanaka, and Uchiyama [48] proposed a quantum PKC which withstands certain well-known quantum attacks.
Our proposed quantum PKC also seems to fend off a polynomial-time quantum adversary since we can reduce
the problem GA to QSCDff , where GA is not known to be solved efficiently on a quantum computer.
1.3 Later Work
After the publication of the preliminary version [30] of this paper, the notion of quantum-state indistinguisha-
bility and its associated quantum encryption schemes have been further studied. Here are some of the recent
results related to the topics of this paper. Hayashi, Kawachi, and Kobayashi [25] showed that QSCDcyc satis-
fies the indistinguishability property against time-unbounded quantum algorithms in such a way that QSCDff
does. In information-theoretical settings, Nikolopoulos [46] and Nikolopoulos and Ioannou [47] proposed new
quantum encryption schemes. Kawachi and Portmann [34] proved that, with respect to the ratio of message
length and key size, any quantum encryption scheme has no advantage over a classical one-time pad scheme if
we impose certain information-theoretically strong security requirement on the quantum encryption scheme.
2 Cryptographic Properties of QSCDff
Through this section, we will show that QSCDff enjoys the following three cryptographically useful properties:
(i) a trapdoor, (ii) the equivalence between average-case hardness and worst-case hardness under polynomial-
time reductions, and (iii) a reduction from two computationally-hard problems to QSCDff . These properties
will help us to construct a quantum PKC in Section 3. We assume, throughout this paper, the reader’s familiarity
with the basics of quantum computation [45] and of finite group theory [53].
All the cryptographic properties of QSCDff are consequences of the following characteristics of the set
Kn of the hidden permutations. (i) Each permutation π ∈ Kn is of order 2. This provides the trapdoor of
QSCDff . (ii) For any π ∈ Kn, the conjugacy class {τ−1πτ : τ ∈ Sn} of π is equal to Kn. This property
enables us to prove the equivalence between the worst-case hardness and average-case hardness of QSCDff .
(iii) The problem GA is (polynomial-time Turing) equivalent to its subproblem with the promise that any given
graph has either a unique non-trivial automorphism in Kn or none at all. This equivalence relation is used to
give a complexity-theoretic lower bound of QSCDff ; that is, the average-case hardness of QSCDff is lower-
bounded by the worst-case hardness of GA. To prove those properties, we introduce two new techniques: (i)
a variant of the so-called coset sampling method, which is widely used in various extensions of Shor’s well-
known algorithm (see, e.g., [50]) and (ii) a quantum version of the hybrid argument, which is a powerful tool
for many security reductions used in computational cryptography.
Now, recall the two quantum states ρ+pi = 12n!
∑
σ∈Sn(|σ〉+ |σπ〉)(〈σ|+ 〈σπ|) and ρ−pi = 12n!
∑
σ∈Sn(|σ〉−
|σπ〉)(〈σ| − 〈σπ|) for a permutation π ∈ Kn. For convenience, let ι(n) (or simply ι) denote the maximally
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mixed state 1n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉〈σ| over Sn, which will appear later.
2.1 A Trapdoor
We start by proving that QSCDff has a trapdoor. To prove this claim, it suffices to present an efficient distin-
guishing algorithm between ρ+pi and ρ−pi with an extra knowledge of their hidden permutation π ∈ Kn.
Theorem 2.1 (Distinguishing Algorithm) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, for any
security parameter n ∈ N and for any hidden permutation π ∈ Kn, distinguishes between ρ+pi (n) and ρ−pi (n)
using π with probability 1.
Proof. Fix n ∈ N arbitrarily. Let χ be any given unknown quantum state, which is limited to either ρ+pi or
ρ−pi . The desired distinguishing algorithm for χ works as follows.
(D1) Prepare two quantum registers. The first register holds a control bit and the second register holds χ.
Apply the Hadamard transformation H to the first register. The state of the system now becomes
H|0〉〈0|H ⊗ χ.
(D2) Apply the Controlled-π operator Cpi to the both registers, where the operator Cpi behaves as Cpi|0〉|σ〉 =
|0〉|σ〉 and Cpi|1〉|σ〉 = |1〉|σπ〉 for any given σ ∈ Sn. Since π2 = id for every π ∈ Kn, the state of the
entire system can be expressed as
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
|ψ+pi,σ〉〈ψ+pi,σ| if χ = ρ+pi , and
1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
|ψ−pi,σ〉〈ψ−pi,σ | if χ = ρ−pi ,
where |ψ+pi,σ〉 and |ψ−pi,σ〉 are defined as
|ψ±pi,σ〉 = Cpi
(
1
2
|0〉 (|σ〉 ± |σπ〉) + 1
2
|1〉 (|σ〉 ± |σπ〉)
)
=
1
2
|0〉(|σ〉 ± |σπ〉) + 1
2
|1〉(|σπ〉 ± |σ〉).
(D3) Apply the Hadamard transformation again to the first register. Since χ is either ρ+pi or ρ−pi , the state of the
entire system becomes either
(H ⊗ I)|ψ+pi,σ〉 =
1√
2
|0〉 (|σ〉+ |σπ〉) or (H ⊗ I)|ψ−pi,σ〉 =
1√
2
|1〉 (|σ〉 − |σπ〉) ,
respectively. Measure the first register in the computational basis. If the measured result is 0, then output
YES; otherwise, output NO.
It is clear that the above procedure gives the correct answer with probability 1. ✷
2.2 A Reduction from Worst Case to Average Case
We intend to reduce the worst-case hardness of QSCDff to its average-case hardness. Such a reduction implies
that QSCDff with a random permutation π is at least as hard as QSCDff with the fixed permutation π′ of the
highest complexity. Since the converse reduction is trivial, the average-case hardness of QSCDff is therefore
polynomial-time Turing equivalent to its worst-case hardness.
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Theorem 2.2 Let k be any polynomial and let A be a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves k-
QSCDff with non-negligible advantage for a uniformly random π ∈ Kn; namely, there exists a polynomial p
such that, for infinitely many security parameters n in N ,∣∣∣∣Prpi,A[A(ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]− Prpi,A[A(ρ−pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > 1p(n) ,
where π is chosen uniformly at random from Kn. Then, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm B
that solves k-QSCDff with non-negligible advantage for any permutation π ∈ Kn.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary parameter n ∈ N that satisfies the assumption of the theorem. Assume that our
input is either ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n) or ρ−pi (n)⊗k(n). For each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k(n)}, let χi be the ith state of the given k(n)
states. Clearly, χi is either ρ+pi or ρ−pi . From the given average-case algorithm A, we build the desired worst-case
algorithm B in the following way.
(R1) Choose a permutation τ ∈ Sn uniformly at random.
(R2) Apply τ to each χi, where i ∈ {1, ..., k(n)}, from the right. If χi = ρ+pi , then we obtain the quantum
state
χ′i =
1
2n!
∑
σ∈Sn
(|στ〉 + |σττ−1πτ〉)(〈στ | + 〈σττ−1πτ |)
=
1
2n!
∑
σ′∈Sn
(|σ′〉+ |σ′τ−1πτ〉)(〈σ′|+ 〈σ′τ−1πτ |).
When χi = ρ−pi , we instead obtain χ′i =
1
2n!
∑
σ′∈Sn
(|σ′〉 − |σ′τ−1πτ〉)(〈σ′| − 〈σ′τ−1πτ |).
(R3) Invoke the average-case quantum algorithm A on the input ⊗ki=1 χ′i.
(R4) Output the outcome of A.
Let π ∈ Kn. Note that, for each τ ∈ Sn, τ−1πτ belongs to Kn. Moreover, for every π′ ∈ Kn, there exists a
τ ∈ Sn satisfying τ−1πτ = π′, from which it follows that the conjugacy class {τ−1πτ : τ ∈ Sn} of π is equal
to Kn. As shown below, the number of all permutations τ ∈ Sn for which τ−1πτ = π′ is independent of the
choice of π′ ∈ Kn.
Claim 1 For any permutations π, π′, π′′ ∈ Kn, |{τ ∈ Sn : τ−1πτ = π′}| = |{τ ∈ Sn : τ−1πτ = π′′}|.
Proof. Define a map µτ : Kn → Kn as µτ (σ) = τ−1στ and a set Tpi,pi′ := {µτ : µτ (π) = π′}. It
is obvious that, by defining a group operation “ · ” as µτ · µτ ′(·) = µτ (µτ ′(·)), Tpi,pi becomes a subgroup of
Sn := {µτ : τ ∈ Sn}. Therefore, Sn has a coset decomposition with respect to its subgroup Tpi,pi for any
π ∈ Kn and each coset coincides with Tpi,pi′ for a certain π′. This shows that |Tpi,pi′| = |Tpi,pi′′ | for every pair
π′, π′′. Since µτ and τ have a one-to-one correspondence, it follows that, for every π′, π′′, |{τ ∈ Sn : τ−1πτ =
π′}| = |{τ ∈ Sn : τ−1πτ = π′′}|. ✷
The above-mentioned properties imply that τ−1πτ is indeed uniformly distributed over Kn. Therefore, by
feeding the input
⊗k
i=1 χ
′
i to the algorithm A, we can achieve the desired non-negligible advantage of A. This
completes the proof. ✷
2.3 Computational Hardness
The third property of QSCDff relates to the computational hardness of QSCDff . We want to present two claims
that witness its relative hardness against GA. First, we prove that the computational complexity of QSCDff is
8
lower-bounded by that of GA by constructing an efficient reduction from GA to QSCDff . Second, we briefly
discuss relationships among QSCDff , SHSP, and DIST, and we then prove that QSCDff cannot be solved from
o(n log n) copies of input instances.
Now, we prove the first claim concerning the reducibility between GA and QSCDff . Our reduction from GA
to QSCDff consists of two parts: a reduction from GA to a variant of GA, called UniqueGAff , and a reduction
from UniqueGAff to QSCDff . To describe the desired reduction, we formally introduce UniqueGAff . Earlier,
Ko¨bler, Scho¨ning, and Tora´n [35] introduced the following unique graph automorphism problem (UniqueGA).
UNIQUE GRAPH AUTOMORPHISM PROBLEM (UniqueGA):
input: an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges;
promise: G has either a unique non-trivial automorphism or no non-trivial automorphism;
output: YES if G has the non-trivial automorphism, and NO otherwise.
Note that this promise problem UniqueGA is called (1GA, GA) in [35]. The unique graph automorphism with
fully-flipped permutation (UniqueGAff ) is a slight modification of UniqueGA. Recall that N = {n′ ∈ N :
n′ ≡ 2 (mod4)}.
UNIQUE GRAPH AUTOMORPHISM WITH FULLY-FLIPPED PERMUTATION (UniqueGAff ):
input: an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges;
promise: the number n = |V | of nodes is in N . Moreover, G has either a unique non-trivial
automorphism π ∈ Kn or no non-trivial automorphism;
output: YES if G has the non-trivial automorphism, and NO otherwise.
Note that every instance G of UniqueGAff is defined only when the number n of nodes belongs to N .
Regarding UniqueGAff , we want to prove two helpful lemmas. The first lemma uses a variant of a so-called
coset sampling method, which has been widely used in many generalizations of Shor’s algorithm. Recall that
ι(n) = 1n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉〈σ| for each n ∈ N .
Lemma 2.3 There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, given an instance G of UniqueGAff ,
generates a quantum state ρ+pi ifG is an “YES” instance with its unique non-trivial automorphism π, or generates
ι if G is a “NO” instance.
Proof. Let n ∈ N . Given an instance G of UniqueGAff , we first prepare the quantum state
1√
n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉|σ(G)〉, where σ(G) is the graph resulting from relabeling its nodes according to each per-
mutation σ. By discarding the second register, we can obtain a quantum state χ in the first register. If
G is an “YES” instance with the unique non-trivial automorphism π, then this state χ equals ρ+pi since
1√
n!
∑
σ |σ〉|σ(G)〉 = 1√n!
∑
σ∈Sn/〈pi〉(|σ〉 + |σπ〉)|σ(G)〉. Otherwise, since σ(G) 6= σ′(G) for any distinct
σ, σ′ ∈ Sn, χ equals ι = 1n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉〈σ|. ✷
The second lemma requires a variant of the coset sampling method as a technical tool. The lemma in
essence relies on the fact that the hidden π ∈ Kn is an odd permutation for each n ∈ N since, as a special
property of Kn, π can be expressed as a product of an odd number of transpositions.
Lemma 2.4 There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, given an instance G of UniqueGAff ,
generates a quantum state ρ−pi ifG is an “YES” instance with the unique non-trivial automorphism π or generates
ι if G is a “NO” instance.
Proof. Let n ∈ N . Similar to the algorithm given in the proof of Lemma 2.3, we start with the quan-
tum state 1√
n!
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉|σ(G)〉 in two registers. Compute the sign of each permutation in the first regis-
ter and then invert its phase only when the permutation is odd. Consequently, we obtain the quantum state
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1√
n!
∑
σ∈Sn(−1)sgn(σ)|σ〉|σ(G)〉. Recall that sgn(σ) = 0 if σ is even, and sgn(σ) = 1 otherwise. By discard-
ing the second register, we immediately obtain a certain quantum state, say, χ in the first register. Note that,
since π is odd, if σ is odd (even, resp.) then σπ is even (odd, resp.). Therefore, it follows that χ = ρ−pi if G is
an “YES” instance with the unique non-trivial automorphism π, and χ = ι otherwise. ✷
We are now ready to present a polynomial-time reduction from GA to QSCDff . This concludes that QSCDff
is computationally at least as hard as GA for infinitely-many input lengths n (and thus in worst-case).
Theorem 2.5 If there exist a polynomial k and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves k-QSCDff
with non-negligible advantage, then there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves GA in the
worst case for infinitely-many input lengths n.
Proof. We first show that GA is polynomial-time Turing equivalent to UniqueGAff . Later, we give a
polynomial-time Turing reduction from UniqueGAff to QSCDff . By combining these two reductions, we
can reduce GA to QSCDff . The reduction from GA to UniqueGAff we define is similar to the one given by
Ko¨bler, Scho¨ning, and Tora´n [35], who presented a polynomial-time Turing reduction from GA to UniqueGA.
Their polynomial-time algorithm for GA makes queries to a given oracle that correctly represents UniqueGA
on the promised inputs. This algorithm works correctly because all queries made by the algorithm satisfy the
promise of UniqueGA; that is, every query is a graph of even number of nodes with either a unique non-trivial
automorphism without any fixed point or no non-trivial automorphism at all. By a slight modification of their
reduction, we can obtain a reduction from GA to UniqueGAff . Furthermore, it is also possible to make our
length parameter n satisfy the specific equation n = 2(2n′ + 1), where n′ ∈ N. As a result, we obtain the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.6 UniqueGAff is polynomial-time Turing equivalent to GA.
In fact, a stronger statement than Lemma 2.6 holds. When a Turing reduction to a promise problem makes
only queries that satisfy the promise of the problem, this reduction is called smart [23]. The reduction from GA
to UniqueGA given by Ko¨bler, Scho¨ning, and Tora´n [35] is indeed smart, and therefore so is our reduction. For
readability, we postpone the proof of Lemma 2.6 until Appendix.
From Lemma 2.6, it suffices to construct a reduction from UniqueGAff to QSCDff . Assume that there
exist two polynomials k and p and also a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A such that, for infinitely many
n’s, A solves k-QSCDff with advantage 1/p(n). Let us fix an arbitrary n for which A solves k-QSCDff with
advantage 1/p(n). On a given instance G of UniqueGAff , we perform the following procedure:
(S1) Generate from G two sequences S+ = (χ+⊗k, ..., χ+⊗k) and S− = (χ−⊗k, ..., χ−⊗k) of 8p2(n)n
instances by running the generation algorithms given in Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
(S2) Invoke A on each component in S+ and S− as an input. Let R+ = (A(χ+⊗k), ...,A(χ+⊗k)) and
R− = (A(χ−⊗k), ...,A(χ−⊗k)) be the resulting sequences of 8p2(n)n entries.
(S3) Output YES if the difference ℓ between the number of 1’s in R+ and that in R− is at least 4p(n)n; output
NO otherwise.
Note that if G is an “YES” instance, then S+ and S− should have the form S+ = (ρ+⊗kpi , ..., ρ+⊗kpi ) and
S− = (ρ−⊗kpi , ..., ρ−⊗kpi ) of 8p2(n)n entries; otherwise, we have S+ = S− = (ι⊗k, ..., ι⊗k). Therefore, if G is
an “YES” instance, the numbers of 1’s in R+ and in R− are highly likely different.
Finally, we estimate the difference ℓ. Let X+ and X− be two random variables respectively expressing
the numbers of 1’s in R+ and in R−. Assume that G is an “YES” instance. Since A solves k-QSCDff with
advantage 1/p(n), we have |Pr[A(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1] − Pr[A(ρ−⊗kpi ) = 1]| > 1/p(n). Next, we want to show that
Pr[|X+ −X−| > 4p(n)n] > 1− 2e−n using the Ho¨ffding bounds, which are stated below.
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Lemma 2.7 (Ho¨ffding [27]) Let (X1, ...,Xm) be any sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables on
{0, 1} such that Pr[Xi = 1] = p for any i ∈ {1, ...,m}, and let X be a random variable expressing the number
of 1’s in the sequence, i.e., X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Then, for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, it holds that
Pr [X > (p + δ)m] < e−2mδ
2
and Pr [X < (p− δ)m] < e−2mδ2 .
For convenience, we define pL = max{Pr[A(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1],Pr[A(ρ−⊗kpi ) = 1]} and pS =
min{Pr[A(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1],Pr[A(ρ−⊗kpi ) = 1]}. From our assumption, we obtain pL − pS > 1/p(n). Note
that R+ and R− are precisely two sequences of 8p2(n)n independent Bernoulli random variables on {0, 1}
with probabilities pL and pS . We denote by XL (XS , resp.) the number of 1’s in the sequence associated with
pL (pS , resp.). The Ho¨ffding bounds imply
Pr [XL < (pL − δ)m] < e−n and Pr [XS > (pS + δ)m] < e−n,
where m = 8p2(n)n and δ = 1/(4p(n)). Since pL − pS > 1/p(n), we obtain (pL − pS − 2δ)m > 4p(n)n.
From this inequality, it follows that
Pr
[|X+ −X−| > 4p(n)n] ≥ Pr [|X+ −X−| > (pL − pS − 2δ)m]
≥ Pr [XL > (pL − δ)m ∧ XS < (pS + δ)m] .
Since XL and XS are independent, we obtain a lower bound:
Pr [XL > (pL − δ)m ∧ XS < (pS + δ)m] ≥ (1− e−n)2 > 1− 2e−n,
from which we conclude that Pr[|X+ −X−| > 4p(n)n] > 1− 2e−n.
Similarly, when G is a “NO” instance, we have Pr[|X+ −X−| < 4p(n)n] > 1 − 2e−n. This guarantees
that the above procedure solves UniqueGAff efficiently. ✷
As noted in Section 1, our distinction problem QSCDff has its roots in SHSP. A special case of SHSP is
known to be reducible to DIST, which is a problem of distinguishing between {ρ+pi (n)}n∈N and {ι(n)}n∈N . As
Hallgren, Moore, Ro¨tteler, Russell, and Sen [26] demonstrated, solving DIST from o(n log n) identical copies
is impossible even for a time-unbounded quantum algorithm. Now, we show a close relationship between
QSCDff and DIST.
Before stating our claim (Theorem 2.9), we present an algorithm that converts ρ+pi to ρ−pi for each fixed
π ∈ Kn. This algorithm is a key to the proof of the theorem and further to the construction of a quantum PKC
in the subsequent section.
Lemma 2.8 (Conversion Algorithm) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, with certainty,
converts ρ+pi (n) into ρ−pi (n) and keeps ι(n) as it is for any parameter n ∈ N and any hidden permutation π ∈ Kn.
Proof. Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. First, recall the definition of sgn(σ): sgn(σ) = 0 if σ is even and sgn(σ) = 1
otherwise. Let π ∈ Kn be any hidden permutation and consider its corresponding quantum state ρ+pi . On input
ρ+pi , our desired algorithm simply inverts its phase according to the sign of the permutation. This is done by
performing the following transformation:
|σ〉+ |σπ〉 7−→ (−1)sgn(σ)|σ〉+ (−1)sgn(σpi)|σπ〉.
Note that determining the sign of a given permutation takes only time polynomial in n. Since π is odd, sgn(σ)
and sgn(σπ) are different; thus, the above algorithm obviously converts ρ+pi to ρ−pi . Moreover, the algorithm
does not alter the quantum state ι. ✷
The intractability result of DIST [26], stated above, also holds for QSCDff . To prove this claim, we want to
show in Theorem 2.9 that DIST can be reduced to QSCDff in polynomial time. As a result, no time-unbounded
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quantum algorithm can solve QSCDff from o(n log n) copies. The proof of the theorem requires a quantum
version of a so-called hybrid argument used in computational cryptography.
Theorem 2.9 Let k be any polynomial. If there exists a quantum algorithm A such that
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]− PrA [A(ρ−pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > ε(n)
for any security parameter n ∈ N , then there exists a quantum algorithm B such that, for each n ∈ N ,
∣∣∣∣PrB [B(ρ+pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]− PrB [B(ι(n)⊗k(n)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > ε(n)4 .
Proof. Fix n ∈ N arbitrarily and we hereafter omit this parameter n. Assume that a quantum algorithm A
distinguishes between ρ+⊗kpi and ρ−⊗kpi with advantage at least ε(n). Let A′ be the algorithm that applies the
conversion algorithm of Lemma 2.8 to a given state χ (which is either ρ+⊗kpi or ι⊗k) and then feeds the resulting
state χ′ (either ρ−⊗kpi or ι⊗k) to A. It thus follows that A′(ρ+⊗kpi ) = A(ρ−⊗kpi ) and A′(ι⊗k) = A(ι⊗k). By the
triangle inequality, we have
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1]− PrA [A(ι⊗k) = 1]
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣PrA′ [A′(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1]− PrA′ [A′(ι⊗k) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > ε(n)
for any parameter n ∈ N . This inequality leads us to either
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1]− PrA [A(ι⊗k) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > ε(n)2
or ∣∣∣∣PrA′ [A′(ρ+⊗kpi ) = 1]− PrA′ [A′(ι⊗k) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > ε(n)2 .
To complete the proof, we design the desired algorithm B as follows: first choose either A or A′ at random
and then simulate the chosen algorithm. It is easy to verify that B distinguishes between ρ+⊗kpi and ι⊗k with
advantage at least ε(n)/4. ✷
3 An Application to a Quantum Public-Key Cryptosystem
Section 2 has shown the three useful cryptographic properties of QSCDff . Founded on these properties, we
wish to construct a quantum PKC whose security is guaranteed by the computational hardness of QSCDff
(which can be further reduced to the hardness of GA). As the first step, we give an efficient quantum algorithm
that generates ρ+pi from π.
Lemma 3.1 (ρ+
pi
-Generation Algorithm) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that, on input
π ∈ Kn, generates the quantum state ρ+pi with probability 1.
Proof. The desired generation algorithm, which is given below, uses two registers. Here, we omit the proof of
the correctness of the given algorithm because the correctness is obvious from the description of the algorithm.
(G1) Prepare the state |0〉|id〉 in two quantum registers.
(G2) Apply the Hadamard transformation to the first register to obtain the state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉)|id〉.
(G3) Perform the Controlled-π on the both registers and we then obtain the state 1√
2
(|0〉|id〉 + |1〉|π〉).
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(G4) Subtract 1 from the content of the first register only when the second register contains π. This process
gives rise to the state 1√
2
(|0〉|id〉 + |0〉|π〉).
(G5) Apply a uniformly random permutation σ to the content of the second register from the left. The whole
quantum system then becomes 1√
2
(|0〉|σ〉 + |0〉|σπ〉).
(G6) Output the content of the second register, which produces the state ρ+pi with probability 1.
✷
Hereafter, we describe our quantum PKC and then give its security proof. For the security proof, in particu-
lar, we need to clarify our model of adversary’s attack. Of all attack models discussed in [7], we use a quantum
analogue of the indistinguishability against the chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA). Our scenario is precisely as
follows:
Suppose that large-scale quantum and classical networks connect a unique network administrator,
acting as a trusted third party, and numerous “ordinary” network users, some of who might possibly
be malicious against other users. These parties are all capable of running polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithms. In particular, the administrator (say, Charlie) can communicate with each network
user via a secure, authenticated communication channel; namely, he can deliver to each individual
user a piece of information (both quantum and classical bits) correctly and securely through this
channel. It is most likely that a financial reason could force ordinary users to rely on cheap but
insecure channels for daily person-to-person communication with other users. From such an in-
secure channel, a malicious party (say, Eve) might wiretap the communication. To ensure user’s
secure communication, upon a request from a user (say, Bob) who wants to receive a message
from other users, Charlie generates a decryption (or private) key π and sends it through the secure
channel to Bob. Charlie also generates an encryption (or public) key ρ+pi for anyone who wants to
communicate with Bob.
Now, suppose that a honest party, called Alice, wishes to send Bob a classical single-bit message
securely. For this purpose, she first requests Charlie for Bob’s encryption key ρ+pi . Using this
key, she encrypts her secret message into a quantum state ρ (either ρ+pi or ρ−pi ) as a ciphertext
and then sends it to Bob through an available insecure quantum channel. To eavesdrop Alice’s
secret message, Eve intercepts Alice’s ciphertext ρ. In addition, since Eve is also a legitimate
network user, she can request numerous copies of the encryption key ρ+pi from Charlie (within a
polynomial amount of time). Finally, Eve attempts to learn the information involved with Alice’s
secret message by applying a certain polynomial-time quantum algorithm to the ciphertext ρ as well
as a polynomially many copies of the encryption key ρ+pi obtained from Charlie as supplemental
information.
In the case of classical chosen plaintext attack, all that Eve can collect are Alice’s ciphertext and Bob’s
encryption key. Our scenario is a natural generalization of this classical case because Eve obtains only a
quantum state representing Alice’s encrypted message and copies of a quantum state serving as an encryption
key.
Our scenario demands that the administrator should generate and distribute user’s private and public keys. In
a practical framework of classical PKCs, such a scenario has been frequently used; for example, a governmental
agency may be authorized as a third party to handle those user’s keys. Note that Charlie’s distribution of
decryption keys is done through the secure channel only once at the key setup. With their own single decryption
keys, all the users can transmit their messages securely to others a reasonably large number of times, even
without any extra secret information shared among them. To the contrary, SKCs require the users to share
13
symmetric secret keys between every pair of them. Thus, even under this scenario, we can enjoy advantages of
PKCs over SKCs that stem from the asymmetry of keys in many-to-many communication.
Now, we explain our quantum PKC protocol in detail. In our protocol, Alice transmits a single-bit message
to Bob using an O(n log n)-qubit-long encryption key. Our protocol consists of three phases: key setup phase,
key transmission phase, and message transmission phase. Figure 1 illustrates our protocol.
Charlie
(administrator)
Alice
(sender)
Eve
(adversary)
Bob
(receiver)
piρ + piρ −
piρ +
piρ +
or
Figure 1: our public-key cryptosystem
The following is the step-by-step description of our quantum PKC protocol.
[Key setup phase]
(A1) Charlie generates Bob’s decryption key π uniformly at random from Kn, and then sends it to Bob via a
secure and authenticated channel.
[Key transmission phase]
(A2) Alice requests Bob’s encryption key from Charlie.
(A3) Using π, Charlie generates a copy of the encryption key ρ+pi .
(A4) Alice obtains a copy of the encryption key ρ+pi from Charlie.[Message transmission phase]
(A5) Alice encrypts 0 or 1 respectively into ρ+pi or ρ−pi and then sends this encrypted message to Bob.
(A6) Bob decrypts Alice’s message using the decryption key π.
Step (A1) can be implemented as follows. Recall that π ∈ Kn consists of n/2 disjoint transpositions. We first
choose distinct two numbers i1 and i2 from {1, 2, ..., n} uniformly at random, and make a transposition (i1 i2).
Next, choosing other distinct two numbers i3 and i4 from {1, 2, ..., n} \ {i1, i2} uniformly at random, we make
another transposition (i3 i4). By repeating this process, n/2 disjoint transpositions are chosen uniformly at
random. From them, define π = (i1, i2) · · · (in/2−1, in/2). Step (A3) is done by the ρ+pi -generation algorithm of
Lemma 3.1. The conversion algorithm of Lemma 2.8 implements Step (A5) since Alice sends Bob either the
received state ρ+pi or its converted state ρ−pi . Finally, the distinguishing algorithm of Theorem 2.1 implements
Step (A6).
The security proof of our PKC is done by reducing GA to Eve’s attacking strategy during the message
transmission phase. Our reduction is a simple modification of the reduction given in Theorem 2.5.
Proposition 3.2 Let A be any polynomial-time quantum adversary who attacks our quantum PKC during the
message transmission phase. Assume that there exist two polynomials p(n) and l(n) satisfying that∣∣∣∣Prpi,A[A(ρ+pi , ρ+⊗l(n)pi ) = 1]− Prpi,A[A(ρ−pi , ρ+⊗l(n)pi ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > 1p(n)
for infinitely many parameters n ∈ N . Then, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves GA
for infinitely many input sizes n in the worst case with non-negligible probability.
Proof. The proposition immediately follows from the proof of Theorem 2.5 by replacing ρ+⊗kpi , ρ−⊗kpi , and
ι⊗k in the proof with (ρ+pi , ρ
+⊗l(n)
pi ), (ρ−pi , ρ
+⊗l(n)
pi ), and (ι, ι⊗l(n)), respectively. ✷
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4 A Generalization of QSCDff
In our QSCDff -based quantum PKC, Alice encrypts a single-bit message using an O(n log n)-qubit encryption
key. We wish to show how to increase the size of Alice’s encryption message and construct a multi-bit quantum
PKC built upon a generalization of QSCDff , called QSCDcyc (QSCD with cyclic permutations), which is a
distinction problem among multiple ensembles of quantum states. Recall that Definition 1.1 has introduced
the notion of computational indistinguishability between two ensembles of quantum states. This notion can be
naturally generalized as follows to multiple quantum state ensembles.
Definition 4.1 We say that m ensembles {ρ0(l)}l∈N, ..., {ρm−1(l)}l∈N of quantum states are computationally
indistinguishable if, for any distinct pair i, j ∈ Zm, the advantage of distinguishing between the two ensembles
{ρi(l)}l∈N and {ρj(l)}l∈N is negligible for any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A; namely, for any two
ensembles {ρi(l)}l∈N and {ρj(l)}l∈N, any polynomial p, any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A, and any
sufficiently large number l, it holds that
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρi(l)) = 1]− PrA [A(ρj(l)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < 1p(l) .
The distinction problem among the ensembles {ρ0(l)}l∈N, ..., {ρm−1(l)}l∈N is said to be solvable with non-
negligible advantage if the ensembles are not computationally indistinguishable; that is, there exist two ensem-
bles {ρi(l)}l∈N and {ρj(l)}l∈N, a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A, and a polynomial p such that
∣∣∣∣PrA [A(ρi(l)) = 1]− PrA [A(ρj(l)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > 1p(l)
for infinitely many numbers l ∈ N.
We wish to define a specific distinction problem, denoted succinctly QSCDcyc, among m ensembles of
quantum states. First, we define a new hidden permutation, which will be encoded into certain quantum states.
For any fixed number n ∈ N, let us assume that m ≥ 2 and m divides n. The new hidden permutation π
consists of disjoint n/m cyclic permutations of length m; in other words, π is of the form
π = (i0 i1 · · · im−1) · · · (in−m in−m+1 · · · in−1),
where i0, ..., in−1 ∈ Zn and is 6= it if s 6= t for any pair (s, t). Such a permutation π has the following two
properties: (i) π has no fixed points (i.e., π(i) 6= i for any i ∈ Zn) and (ii) π is of order m (i.e., πm = id). For
convenience, we denote by Kmn (⊆ Sn) the set of all such permutations.
With a help of the hidden permutation π, we can define the new quantum states |Φσpi,s〉 as follows. For each
σ ∈ Sn, π ∈ Kmn , and s ∈ Zm, let
|Φσpi,s〉 =
1√
m
m−1∑
t=0
ωstm|σπt〉,
where ωm = e2pii/m. At last, the distinction problem QSCDcyc is defined in the following way.
Definition 4.2 The problem QSCDcyc is a distinction problem among m ensembles {ρ(0)pi (n)⊗k(n)}n∈N,
..., {ρ(m−1)pi (n)⊗k(n)}n∈N of quantum states, where k is an arbitrary polynomial and the notation ρ(s)pi (n) de-
notes the mixed state 1n!
∑
σ∈Sn |Φσpi,s〉〈Φσpi,s| for each π ∈ Kmn . When k is fixed, we use the notation k-
QSCDcyc instead.
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Similar to the case of QSCDff , we also drop the parameter n wherever possible. Note that QSCDff coin-
cides with QSCDcyc with m = 2 and n is of the form 2(2n′ + 1) for a certain number n′ ∈ N.
This new problem QSCDcyc also enjoys useful cryptographic properties. We first present a trapdoor of
QSCDcyc. In the case of QSCDff , because its trapdoor information π is a permutation of order two, we encode
only a single bit into the both quantum states ρ+pi and ρ−pi . On the contrary, since QSCDcyc uses a permutation
π of order m ≥ 2, it is possible to encode logm bits into the m quantum states ρ(0)pi , ..., ρ(m−1)pi .
Now, we present a generalized distinguishing algorithm working for ρ(s)pi ’s.
Theorem 4.3 (Generalized Distinguishing Algorithm) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
that, for each n ∈ N, π ∈ Kmn , and s ∈ Zm, decrypts ρ(s)pi (n) to s with exponentially-small error probability.
Proof. Let χ be any given quantum state of the form ρ(s)pi for a certain hidden permutation π ∈ Kmn and also
a certain hidden parameter s. Note that χ is a mixture of all pure states |Φσpi,s〉 over a randomly chosen σ ∈ Sn.
It thus suffices to give a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that decrypts |Φσpi,s〉 to s for each fixed σ. Such an
algorithm can be given by conducting the following Generalized Controlled-π Test, which is a straightforward
generalization of the distinguishing algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 2.1. To define this test, we first
recall the quantum Fourier transformation Fm over Zm as well as its inverse F−1m : for any x ∈ Zm,
Fm|x〉 = 1√
m
∑
y∈Zm
ωxym |y〉 and F−1m |x〉 =
1√
m
∑
y∈Zm
ω−xym |y〉.
The Generalized Controlled-π Test is described below.
[Generalized Controlled-π Test]
(D1’) Prepare two quantum registers. The first register holds a control string, initially set to |0〉, and the
second register holds the quantum state |Φσpi,s〉. Apply the inverse Fourier transformation F−1m to the first
register. Meanwhile, assume that we can perform the Fourier transformation exactly. The entire system
then becomes
1√
m
m−1∑
r=0
|r〉|Φσpi,s〉 =
1
m
∑
r,t
ωstm|r〉|σπt〉.
(D2’) Apply π to the content of the second register r times from the right. The state of the entire system
evolves into
1
m
∑
r,t
ωstm|r〉|σπr+t mod m〉.
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(D3’) Apply the Fourier transformation Fm to the first register and we then obtain the state
1
m
∑
r,t
1√
m
m−1∑
r′=0
ωrr
′
m |r′〉ωstm|σπr+t mod m〉
=
1
m3/2
∑
r,r′,t
ωst+rr
′
m |r′〉|σπr+t mod m〉
=
1
m3/2
∑
r,t
ωs(r+t)m |s〉|σπr+t mod m〉+
1
m3/2
∑
r,t,r′ 6=s
ωst+rr
′
m |r′〉|σπr+t mod m〉
=
1√
m
∑
u
ωsum |s〉|σπu〉+
1
m3/2
∑
r,u,r′ 6=s
ωsu+r(r
′−s)
m |r′〉|σπu〉 (u := r + t mod m)
=
1√
m
m−1∑
u=0
ωsum |s〉|σπu〉 = |s〉|Φσpi,s〉 (since
∑
r
ωsu+r(r
′−s)
m = 0 for any u, s, r′(6= s)).
(D4’) Finally, measure the first register in the computational basis and output the measured result s in Zm.
The error probability of the above algorithm depends only on the precision of the Fourier transformation over
Zm. As shown in [32], the quantum Fourier transformation can be implemented with exponentially-small error
probability by an application of the approximated quantum Fourier transformation. Therefore, the theorem
follows. ✷
Similar to QSCDff , the average-case hardness of QSCDcyc coincides with its worst-case hardness.
Theorem 4.4 Let k be any polynomial. Assume that there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that
solves k-QSCDcyc with non-negligible advantage for a uniformly random permutation π ∈ Kmn ; namely, there
exist two numbers s, s′ ∈ Zm and a polynomial p such that, for infinitely many numbers n ∈ N,∣∣∣∣Prpi,A[A(ρ(s)pi (n)⊗k(n)) = 1]− Prpi,A[A(ρ(s
′)
pi (n)
⊗k(n)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ > 1p(n) ,
where π is chosen uniformly at random from Kmn . Then, there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm B
that solves k-QSCDcyc with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. This proof follows an argument in the proof of Theorem 2.2. Here, we give only a sketch of our
desired algorithm B. Choose a uniformly random permutation τ ∈ Sn and then apply it to |Φσpi,s〉 from the
right. Now, we obtain the state
1√
m
m−1∑
t=0
ωstm|σπtτ〉 =
1√
m
m−1∑
t=0
ωstm|σττ−1πtτ〉 =
1√
m
m−1∑
t=0
ωstm|στ(τ−1πτ)t〉.
Note that ρ(s)
τ−1piτ
(n) = 1n!
∑
σ∈Sn |Φσττ−1piτ,s〉〈Φσττ−1piτ,s| is an average-case instance of QSCDcyc since τ−1πτ
is distributed uniformly at random over Kmn . Finally, apply the average-case algorithm A. ✷
We will exhibit a quantum algorithm that generates the quantum state ρ(s)pi efficiently from π and s. This
generation algorithm will be used to generate encryption keys in our QSCDcyc-based multi-bit quantum PKC.
Lemma 4.5 (ρ(s)
pi
-Generation Algorithm) There exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that generates
ρ
(s)
pi for any s ∈ Zm and any π ∈ Kmn with exponentially-small error probability.
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Proof. The desired algorithm is a straightforward generalization of the ρ+pi -generation algorithm given
in the proof of Lemma 3.1. Using the approximated Fourier transformation [32] instead of the Hadamard
transformation, we can efficiently approximate from π the Fourier transformation Fpi over the cyclic group
{id, π, π2, ..., πm−1}:
Fpi|πs〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
t=0
ωstm|πt〉
by employing an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1. Hence, we can perform Fpi on |πs〉 with
exponentially-small error probability.
Since the initial state |πs〉 can be easily generated from π, we immediately obtain an efficient approximation
of Fpi|πs〉. By applying a uniformly-random permutation σ ∈ Sn to the resulting state from the left, the desired
state ρ(s)pi can be obtained with exponentially-small error probability. ✷
Toward the end of this section, we present our multi-bit quantum PKC, based on QSCDcyc.
[Key setup phase]
(A1’) As Bob’s decryption key, Charlie chooses an element π uniformly at random from Kn and then sends it
to Bob via a secure, authenticated channel.
[Key transmission phase]
(A2’) Alice requests Bob’s encryption key from Charlie.
(A3’) Charlie generates a copy of the encryption key (ρ(0)pi , ..., ρ(m−1)pi ) from π and sends it to Alice.
(A4’) Alice receives this copy of the encryption key from Charlie.
[Message transmission phase]
(A5’) If her message is s ∈ Zm, Alice picks up ρ(s)pi . She sends it to Bob as a ciphertext.
(A6’) Bob decrypts Alice’s message using the decryption key π.
By choosing cycles one by one sequentially, we can perform Step (A1’). The ρ(s)pi -generation algorithm of
Lemma 4.5 immediately implements Step (A3’). Alice can encrypt her message s simply by choosing ρ(s)pi out
of the series (ρ(0)pi , ..., ρ(m−1)pi ). Finally, the generalized distinguishing algorithm in Theorem 4.3 achieves Step
(A6’).
As the final remark, we refer to a drawback of the above multi-bit encryption scheme. A major drawback
is that Charlie should send Alice all the series (ρ(0)pi , ..., ρ(m−1)pi ) as Bob’s encryption key, simply because of
the lack of a sophisticated converting algorithm among different encryption keys without knowing the hidden
decryption key π. This QSCDcyc-based encryption scheme requires an O(mn log n)-qubit encryption key to
encrypt a logm-bit message whereas the QSCDff -based encryption scheme needs an O(n log n)-qubit key per
a 1-bit message. In a quick comparison, there seems to be no advantage of the QSCDcyc-based scheme over
the QSCDff -based scheme in terms of the ratio between message length and encryption key length.
This drawback stems from the conversion algorithm, given in Lemma 2.8, used to swap ρ+pi and ρ−pi in the
QSCDff -based single-bit encryption scheme. This conversion algorithm utilizes the “parity” of permutations σ
and σπ to invert their phases without using any information on π. More precisely, the algorithm implements
the homomorphism f from Sn to {+1,−1} (∼= Z/2Z) satisfying that f(σ) = +1 (−1, resp.) if σ is even
(odd, resp.). Unfortunately, the same algorithm fails for QSCDcyc because no homomorphism maps Sn to
{1, ωm, ..., ωm−1m } (∼= Z/mZ). This is shown as follows. Let us assume, to the contrary, that there exists a
homomorphism g mapping Sn to {1, ωm, ..., ωm−1m }. The fundamental homomorphism theorem implies that
Sn/Ker(g) ∼= Z/mZ; namely, there exists an isomorphism from σKer(g) to g(σ) for every σ ∈ Sn. Note
that Ker(g) is a normal subgroup in Sn. It is known that such a normal subgroup in Sn equals either the trivial
group {id} or the alternation group An = {σ ∈ Sn : sgn(σ) = 0} since An is a simple group for n ≥ 5 (see,
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e.g., Theorem 3.2.1 in [53]). Apparently, there is neither isomorphism between {σAn : σ ∈ Sn} and Z/mZ
nor isomorphism between {σ : σ ∈ Sn} and Z/mZ if n > 4 and n ≥ m > 2. This contradicts our assumption
on g.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the computational distinction problem QSCDff satisfies quite useful cryptographic proper-
ties, which help us to design a quantum PKC whose security is guaranteed by the computational intractability
of GA. Although GA is reducible to QSCDff in polynomial time, there seems to be a large gap between the
hardness of GA and that of QSCDff because, in the proof of Theorem 2.5, all combinatorial structures of an
input graph for GA are completely lost in constructing associated quantum states for QSCDff and, from such
states, it is impossible to recover the original graph. It is therefore pressing to find a much better classical
problem (for instance, the problems of finding a centralizer or finding a normalizer [38]) that almost matches
the computational hardness of QSCDff . Since no fast quantum algorithm is known for QSCDff , discovering
such a fast algorithm for QSCDff may require new tools and novel proof techniques in quantum complexity
theory. Besides our quantum states {ρ+pi (n), ρ−pi (n)} used in QSCDff , it is imperative to continue searching for
other pairs of “simple” quantum states whose computational indistinguishability is helpful to construct a more
secure cryptosystem.
Similar to QSCDff , QSCDcyc also owns useful cryptographic properties, for which we have built a multi-bit
quantum PKC. Throughout our study, it is not yet clear how difficult QSCDcyc is and how secure our multi-bit
quantum PKC truly is. If one successfully proves that the worst-case hardness of QSCDcyc is lower-bounded
by, e.g., the hardness of GA, then our multi-bit quantum PKC might find a more practical use in return.
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Appendix: A Reduction from GA to UniqueGAff
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 2.6, in which UniqueGAff is shown to be polynomial-time Turing equiv-
alent to GA. Earlier, Ko¨bler, Scho¨ning, and Tora´n [35] established the polynomial-time Turing equivalence
between GA and UniqueGA. We first review their reduction and then explain how to modify it to obtain the
desired reduction from GA to UniqueGAff . Note that the reduction from UniqueGAff to GA is trivial since
UniqueGAff is simply a special case of GA.
We begin with explaining our technical tool and notation necessary to describe the reduction of [35]. Their
reduction uses a technical tool called a label to distinguish each node of a given graph G from the others. Given
a graph G, let n be the number of nodes in G. The label j attached to node i consists of two chains: one of
which is of length 2n + 3 connected to node i, and the other is of length j connected to the n + 2-nd node of
the first chain. (See Figure 2.)
i
j
1n + 1n +
Figure 2: label
Note that the total size of the label j is 2n+j+3. Let G[i] denote the graph obtained from G by attaching the la-
bel 1 to the node i. Similarly, G[i1,...,ij] is defined as the graph with labels 1, ..., j respectively attached to nodes
i1, ..., ij . Note that any automorphism of G[i] maps the node i into itself and that any label adds no new automor-
phism into this modified graph. Let Aut(G) be the automorphism group of G and let Aut(G)[1,...,i] be the point-
wise stabilizer of {1, ..., i} in Aut(G), namely, Aut(G)[1,...,i] = {σ ∈ Aut(G) : ∀j ∈ {1, ..., i}[σ(j) = j]}.
The following theorem was proven in [35]. For our later reference, we include its proof here.
Theorem 5.1 [35, Theorem 1.31] GA is polynomial-time Turing reducible to UniqueGA.
Proof. Let O be any set that correctly represents UniqueGA on all promised instances. Using O as an oracle,
the following algorithm solves GA in polynomial time. Let G be any given instance of GA.
(U1) Repeat (U2)-(U3) for each i starting with n− 1 down to 1.
(U2) Repeat (U3) for each j ranging from i+ 1 to n.
(U3) Invoke O with input graph G[1,...,i−1,i] ∪G[1,...,i−1,j]. If the outcome of O is YES, output YES and halt.
(U4) Output NO.
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If G is an “YES” instance, there is at least one non-trivial automorphism. Take the largest number i ∈
{1, ..., n} such that there exist a number j ∈ {1, ..., n} and a non-trivial automorphism π ∈ Aut(G)[1,...,i−1]
for which π(i) = j and i 6= j. We want to claim that there is exactly one such non-trivial automorphism,
i.e., Aut(G)[1,...,i−1] = {id, π}. This is seen as follows. First, note that Aut(G)[1,...,i−1] is expressed as
Aut(G)[1,...,i−1] = π1Aut(G)[1,...,i] + · · · + πdAut(G)[1,...,i]. For any two distinct cosets πsAut(G)[1,...,i] and
πtAut(G)[1,...,i] and for any two automorphisms σ ∈ πsAut(G)[1,...,i] and σ′ ∈ πtAut(G)[1,...,i], it holds that
σ(i) 6= σ′(i). Since Aut(G)[1,...,i] = {id} by the definition of i, we obtain |πkAut(G)[1,...,i]| = 1 for any coset
πkAut(G)[1,...,i]. Furthermore, there exists the unique coset πAut(G)[1,...,i] satisfying that σ(i) = j for any
σ ∈ πAut(G)[1,...,i]. These facts imply that the non-trivial automorphism π is unique. Note that the unique non-
trivial automorphism interchanges two subgraphs G[1,...,i−1,i] and G[1,...,i−1,j]. Therefore, the above algorithm
successfully outputs YES at Step (U3).
On the contrary, if G is a “NO” instance, then for every distinct i and j, the modified graph has no non-
trivial automorphism. Thus, the above algorithm correctly rejects G. ✷
Finally, we describe the reduction from GA to UniqueGAff by slightly modifying the reduction given in
the above proof.
Lemma 5.2 GA is polynomial-time Turing reducible to UniqueGAff .
Proof. Recall the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 5.1. We only need to change the number of nodes
to invoke oracle UniqueGAff in (U3). To make such a change, we first modify the size of each label. Since
the number m of all nodes of G[1,...,i−1,i] ∪ G[1,...,i−1,j] is even, if there is no k such that m = 2(2k + 1),
then we add one more node appropriately to the original labels. We then attach our modified labels of length
2n+ i+4 and 2n+ j+4 to the nodes i and j, respectively. Obviously, this modified graph satisfies the promise
of UniqueGAff . Our algorithm therefore works correctly for any instance of GA. ✷
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